

## Message Text

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

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R 141531Z JUL 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6362

INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PARAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 11126

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, XG

SUBJECT: BREZHNEV AND THE ECPC: AN EXERCISE IN KREMLINOLOGY

REF: MOSCOW 10532

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1. BEGIN SUMMARY. SINCE THERE WERE NO REAL SURPRISES AT  
BERLIN, WE CONTINUE TO HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE BREZHNEV

AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS A WHOLE WERE VERY SATISFIED WITH THE ECPC. THEY KNEW THEY WOULD HAVE TO PAY A PRICE AND WERE READY TO PAY IT. HOWEVER, A CLOSE LOOK AT AUTHORITATIVE SOVIET EVALUATIONS OF THE ECPC COULD CONCEIVABLE INDICATE SOME DIFFERENCES AMONG THE LEADERSHIP ON THIS ISSUE. FOR EXAMPLE, WHILE THE FIRST PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON THE ECPC (JULY 2) WAS HIGHLY LAUDATORY REGARDING THE CONFERENCE, ITS DOCUMENT, AND BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, THE DEFINITIVE POLITBURO ASSESSMENT PUBLISHED THE NEXT DAY WAS COMPARATIVELY LUKEWARM TOWARD THE CONFERENCE, UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE STATEMENT, AND SAID NOTHING AT ALL ABOUT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH. FURTHERMORE, THE POLITBURO ASSESSMENT WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY CHARACTERIZED AS "UNANIMOUS"--AS HAS BEEN THE CASE IN THE PAST IN PREVIOUS DOCUMENTS--AND THUS IT SEEMS PLAUSIBLE THAT THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE DID NOT MEET WITH THE APPROVAL OF ALL POLITBURO MEMBERS.

2. ONE POSSIBLE HYPOTHESIS WHICH MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR THESE DIFFERENCES IS THAT SUSLOV AND PERHAPS OTHERS TENDED TO FEEL THAT THE IDEOLOGICAL PRICE FOR CONVENING ECPC WAS TOO HIGH AND CONSEQUENTLY REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH THE GLOWING ASSESSMENT OUTLINED IN THE JULY 2 PRAVDA EDITORIAL. IF THERE IS VALIDITY IN THIS THESIS, A SEPARATE EDITORIAL IN THE MILITARY DAILY "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA," WHICH GIVES HIGH PRAISE TO THE ECPC, MIGHT INDICATE THAT USTINOV SIDED WITH BREZHNEV ON THIS ISSUE.

3. WHILE WE TEND TO THINK THAT THERE WAS REAL DISAGREEMENT, WE STRONGLY DOUBT THAT SENIOR IDEOLOGUE SUSLOV AND HIS FOLLOWERS, IF ANY, HAVE ENOUGH POLITICAL CLOUT TO EFFECT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE BREZHNEV FOREIGN POLICY LINE OR THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP. NOR DO WE THINK SUSLOV HEADS A FIRM "ANTI-BREZHNEV" BLOC. CLEARLY BREZHNEV REGARDED THE CONVENING OF ECPC AS A TRIUMPH FOR HIS "PEACE PROGRAM" WHICH WAS INTIMATELY LINKED TO THE RESULTS OF CSCE AND TO STABILIZING THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. AS SUCH, IF EVENTS OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT INDEED LOSE  
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MUCH BY HOLDING THE CONFERENCE, THEN THE ECPC MIGHT HAVE THE ULTIMATE RESULT OF STRENGTHENING HIS HAND AGAINST SUSLOV AND PERHAPS OTHERS. IN ANY CASE, IF THERE IS SOME VALIDITY IN THE HYPOTHESIS WHICH WE PROPOSE, THIS EPISODE WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE THAT IDEOLOGICAL HARDLINERS ARE A FORCE BREZHNEV MUST RECKON WITH WHEN, IN THEIR VIEW, PURSUIT OF THE BREZHNEV LINE CONFLICTS WITH FUNDAMENTAL PROGRAMMATIC AND IDEOLOGICAL TENETS. END SUMMARY.

4. AS INDICATED IN MOSCOW 10532, WE BELIEVE BREZHNEV

AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AS A WHOLE WERE SATISFIED WITH THE OUTCOME OF THE ECPC. WE AGREE WITH BELGRADE'S 4483 THAT THE VERY FACT A EUROPEAN CONFERENCE WAS HELD AT THE FIRST-SECRETARY LEVEL SATISFIED A BASIC SOVIET AIM OF SHOWING FUNDAMENTAL SOLIDARITY AMONG COMMUNIST COUNTRIES AND PARTIES. ALTHOUGH THE CONTENT OF THE MEETING OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT IDEAL FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, WE BELIEVE THE RESULTS WERE IN MOSCOW'S EYES BASICALLY POSITIVE: THE GATHERING ACQUIESCED IN THE CPSU'S ANALYSIS OF BASIC HISTORICAL TRENDS IN EUROPE WHEN IT "ADOPTED" A DOCUMENT STEMMING LARGELY FROM A SOVIET-INSPIRED DRAFT. BY ORIGIN AND INTENT, THEREFORE, THE DOCUMENT DERIVED ITS ACTION PROGRAM FOR EUROPE FROM THE "PEACE PROGRAM" OF THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS AND THE POLICIES OUTLINED AT THE 25TH CONGRESS, WHICH HAVE BECOME IDENTIFIED WITH BREZHNEV PERSONALLY. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE ECPC'S "PROGRAM" INCLUDE:

- STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, SECURITY, COOPERATION AND "SOCIAL PROGRESS" IN EUROPE, UTILIZING A BROAD COALITION OF ALL PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES, AND DEVELOPING "ACTIVE CAMPAIGNING;"
- "DEMONSTRATIONS OF SOLIDARITY" AND OTHER FORMS OF MASS ACTION;
- ELIMINATE OPPOSING MILITARY BLOCS, AND STRESS EXPANDED EAST-WEST COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY ECONOMIC COOPERATION;
- "ISOLATE AND OVERCOME ANTI-COMMUNISM" AND STRUGGLE AGAINST MONOPOLIES, WHILE IDENTIFYING PEACE AND SECURITY WITH SOCIALISM IN THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC MIND;
- THUS CREATE MORE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR "DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATIONS" IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS FURTHER ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ADVANCES WITHIN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.

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5. THERE CAN BE LITTLE QUESTION THAT NOTHING HAPPENED AT BERLIN TO CHANGE THE CPSU'S BASIC CONVICTIONS REGARDING PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM, DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT, AND THE USSR'S "NATURAL" LEADING ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THE TRAIL-BLAZER AND THE BEST QUALIFIED INTERPRETER OF MARXISM-LENINISM. AS HAS HAPPENED SO MANY TIMES IN THE PAST, MOSCOW MADE WHAT IT REGARDS AS TACTICAL CONCESSIONS TO ADVANCE LARGER-TERM STRATEGIC AIMS. IN THIS SENSE, AS SUGGESTED IN SOFIA'S 1380, ZHIVKOV AND HONECKER VERY PROBABLY PORTRAYED SOVIET DOCTRINAL VIEWS MORE CLEARLY THAN DID BREZHNEV HIMSELF.

6. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CERTAINLY WAS NOT PLEASED WITH PROCLAMATIONS OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE ANTI-SOVIET CAST TO SOME OF THE SPEECHES AT BERLIN, NOR WITH THE TENDENCY OF WESTERN NEWS MEDIA TO FOCUS PRIMARILY ON THIS ASPECT OF THE MEETING. BUT THE CPSU HEARD SIMILAR STATEMENTS

OF INDEPENDENCE AT THE 25TH CONGRESS, WHICH IN TURN  
EVOKED WESTERN MEDIA COVERAGE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE  
ECPC. AND THE MANY PRELIMINARY MEETINGS AND NEGOTIATIONS  
PRECEDING THE ECPC SURELY MADE CLEAR TO THE CPSU  
THE POSITIONS OF THE MAJOR PARTICIPANTS. IN SHORT, WE  
DOUBT THAT UNFORESEEN EVENTS AT THE CONFERENCE CREATED  
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS FOR BREZHNEV WITHIN THE SOVIET  
LEADERSHIP.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6363  
INFO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST  
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST  
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
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7. HOWEVER, THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNS, AS NOTED IN MOSCOW 10532, OF LACK OF FULL CONSENSUS WITHIN THE CPSU LEADERSHIP REGARDING THE ECPC. PERHAPS THE CLEAREST INDICATION WAS THE EDITING OF SUSLOV'S TOUGH LINE ON PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM (PI) IN MID-MARCH. RECENT SOVIET EDITORIAL TREATMENT OF THE CONFERENCE, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE OFFICIAL POLITBURO EVALUATION OF IT, COULD  
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BE INTERPRETED AS SIGNALING DIVERGENCIES WITHIN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP CONCERNING THE PROPER ASSESSMENT FOR ECPC. (WE, THEREFORE, WERE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN THE SOVIET EMBOFF'S REMARK, REPORTED IN BELGRADE 4483, THAT FOR HIM THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULT OF ECPC WAS ITS IMPACT ON THE SOVIET INTERNAL SCENE, IN WHICH BREZHNEV CAME OUT AHEAD OF SUSLOV). SPECIFICALLY, COMPARISON OF THE INITIAL PRAVDA ECPC EDITORIAL OF JULY 2 WITH THE POLITBURO EVALUATION CARRIED IN PRAVDA ON JULY 3, AND WITH THE SUBSEQUENT JULY 5 PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON THE MEETING, REVEALS IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES REGARDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ECPC, THE MEANING OF THE DOCUMENT, BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, SOVIET APPROVAL OF THE MEETING, AND PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM. THESE DIFFERENCES ARE HEIGHTENED WHEN VIEWED AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF SOVIET TREATMENT OF THE 1969 MEETING OF WORLD PARTIES AND THE 1975 CSCE SUMMIT.

8. ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ECPC, COMPARISON OF THE JULY 2 EDITORIAL WITH THE JULY 3 POLITBURO STATEMENT DISCLOSES THAT:  
--THE FIRST EDITORIAL TERMED IT "AN OUTSTANDING LAND-MARK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT," AN EVENT OF "GREAT SIGNIFICANCE" CHARACTERIZED BY "FULL SUCCESS," WHICH "RAISED HIGH THE BANNER OF UNITY OF THE EUROPEAN PARTIES;"  
--THE POLITBURO EVALUATED THE MEETING AS HAVING MADE "AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION" TO THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, SECURITY, COOPERATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN EUROPE, AND AS HAVING BECOME "A FACTOR" IN STRENGTHENING COORDINATION AND COOPERATION AMONG FRATERNAL PARTIES;  
--THE JULY 5 EDITORIAL ECHOED THIS LINE, ADDING THE FLOURISH THAT "ALL SOVIET COMMUNISTS" AGREED WITH IT.

9. ON THE ECPC DOCUMENT,  
--THE JULY 2 EDITORIAL SAID THE DOCUMENT "CONTAINED NOT ONLY A DEEP MARXIST-LENINIST CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE, BUT ALSO, AND OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE, IT DEFINED THOROUGHLY-CONSIDERED, JOINTLY ELABORATED AIMS AND TASKS." THUS THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE RECEIVED "A DEVELOPED PROGRAM OF STRUGGLE" FOR

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THE BRIGHT FUTURE OF THEIR CONTINENT;

--THE POLITBURO DESCRIBED THE DOCUMENT AS "BASED ON PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM" AND CONTAINING "JOINT EVALUATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS" FOR THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE;

--THE JULY 5 EDITORIAL ECHOED THE POLITBURO LINE, ADDING THAT WHILE ACCEPTANCE OF THE DOCUMENT WAS IMPORTANT, ATTAINMENT OF THE GOALS IT SET FORTH WAS MORE IMPORTANT STILL.

10. REGARDING BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN BERLIN,

--THE FIRST EDITORIAL CLAIMED IT HAD "FUNDAMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE," WAS MET WITH GREAT ATTENTION AND INTEREST, AND PROVIDED A "DEEP MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS" OF THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION;

--THE POLITBURO EVALUATION SAID NOTHING AT ALL ABOUT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH;

--THE SECOND EDITORIAL DEVOTED A SINGLE SENTENCE TO THE SPEECH, AND WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY APPROVING ITS CONTENT, SAID THE SPEECH WAS "A CENTRAL EVENT OF THE CONFERENCE," WAS "DEEPLY AND CLEARLY ARGUED," "PERMEATED WITH CALM AND ASSURANCE," CONTAINED A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF EVENTS IN EUROPE, AND CHARACTERIZED THE "ENORMOUS WORK BEING CARRIED OUT BY OUR PARTY AND GOVERNMENT IN REALIZING THE 'PROGRAM OF FURTHER STRUGGLE FOR PEACE' APPROVED BY THE 25TH CONGRESS."

11. REGARDING APPROVAL OF THE ECPC,

--THE JULY 2 EDITORIAL CLAIMED THAT SOVIET COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE WERE "DEEPLY SATISFIED" WITH THE ECPC'S SUCCESSES, AND "MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF SOVIET PEOPLE WARMLY APPROV" BREZHNEV'S SPEECH; --THE JULY 3 POLITBURO STATEMENT "COMPLETELY AND FULLY" (BUT NOT "UNANIMOUSLY") APPROVED THE ACTIVITY OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AND, AS NOTED, WAS SILENT ABOUT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH;

--THE JULY 5 EDITORIAL, ENTITLED "FULL APPROVAL, SUPPORT OF ALL THE PEOPLE," REPEATED THE POLITBURO FORMULATION, GILDING THE LILY BY ADDING THAT THIS VIEW WAS SHARED BY ALL SOVIET COMMUNISTS AND THE ENTIRE SOVIET PEOPLE, "WHO WARMLY APPROVE THE POLICY OF THE PARTY AND VALUE HIGHLY THE VARIED AND CONSISTENT ACTIVITY OF THE CPSU CC, THE CC POLITBURO, AND GENERAL SECRETARY

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OF THE CC L.I. BREZHNEV."

12. AND ON PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM,

--THE JULY 2 EDITORIAL DEVOTED A PARAGRAPH TO REPEATING THE DEFINITION OF PI GIVEN IN BREZHNEV'S ECPC SPEECH, AND NOTING THAT PI HAD THROUGH TIME FULLY PRESERVED ALL OF ITS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE;  
--THE POLITBURO STATEMENT DID NOT MENTION PI;  
--THE SECOND EDITORIAL SAID ONLY THAT PI WAS AND REMAINED THE MOST POWERFUL AND PROVEN WEAPON OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE STRUGGLE TO TRANSFORM THE WORLD.

13. WHEN COMPARED WITH THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOLLOWING THE 1969 MEETING OF COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES, AND THOSE FOLLOWING THE 1975 CSCE SUMMIT, THE COMPARABLE SEQUENCE AFTER THE ECPC--PARTICULARLY THE APPEARANCE OF THE POLITBURO'S ASSESSMENT--SEEMS RUSHED:

--THE 1969 MEETING ENDED ON JUNE 17; A DOUBLE-COLUMN EDITORIAL APPEARED IN PRAVDA JUNE 21; A CC PLENUM WAS HELD ON JUNE 26, AND ITS LENGTHY RESOLUTION ON THE MEETING WAS PUBLISHED ON JUNE 27; A SECOND DOUBLE-COLUMN EDITORIAL, BASED ON THE CC RESOLUTION, APPEARED IN PRAVDA THE NEXT DAY. THE OVERALL SEQUENCE TOOK ELEVEN DAYS;

--THE HELSINKI MEETING ENDED AUGUST 1; THE FIRST EDITORIAL (SINGLE-COLUMN) APPEARED AUGUST 3; THE ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITBURO, SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WAS PRINTED AUGUST 7; AND THE DEFINITIVE DOUBLE-COLUMN EDITORIAL APPEARED THE NEXT DAY. THE POST-CSCE SEQUENCE THUS WAS COMPLETED IN SEVEN DAYS;

--THE ECPC ENDED ON JUNE 30; A DOUBLE-COLUMN EDITORIAL APPEARED IN PRAVDA JULY 2; THE POLITBURO EVALUATION WAS PRINTED IN PRAVDA JUNE 3; AND A SECOND DOUBLE-COLUMN EDITORIAL, WHICH ESSENTIALLY EMBELLISHED THE POLITBURO STATEMENT AND THUS IN EFFECT REVISED THE INITIAL EDITORIAL LINE, APPEARED IN PRAVDA JULY 5. THE SEQUENCE WAS COMPLETED IN SIX DAYS, WITH ONLY ONE DAY SEPARATING THE FIRST PRAVDA EDITORIAL FROM THE POLITBURO ASSESSMENT (CONTRASTED TO A TEN-DAY GAP IN 1969, AND A SIX-DAY GAP IN 1975).

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14. THERE WERE ALSO INTERESTING DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN THE POST-CONFERENCE STATEMENTS IN 1969, 1975 AND IN THE CURRENT INSTANCE. THE FIRST EDITORIAL ON THE 1969 GATHERING OFFERED A RELATIVELY FACTUAL ACCOUNT OF THE AFFAIR. A CC PLENUM THEN HEARD BREZHNEV REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE AND PRESENT A RESOLUTION CONCERNING IT, WHICH THE CC APPROVED "UNANIMOUSLY". THE RESOLUTION ITSELF "COMPLETELY AND FULLY" APPROVED "THE POLITICAL LINE AND PRACTICAL  
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ACTIVITY" OF THE POLITBURO, AND NOTED THAT THE CC "UNANIMOUSLY SUPPORTED" THE POSITIONS EXPRESSED IN THE SPEECH OF THE CPSU DELEGATION AT THE CONFERENCE. THE SECOND EDITORIAL ELABORATED UPON THE CC RESOLUTION.

15. IN THE CASE OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE FIRST PRAVDA EDITORIAL (PRINTED IN THE REGULAR, SINGLE-COLUMN FORMAT) CONTAINED A GOOD DEAL OF EVALUATIVE COMMENT, NOTING THAT THE MEETING WAS A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL EVENT, HAD ENDED SUCCESSFULLY, THAT BREZHNEV'S SPEECH AND BILATERAL MEETINGS MADE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION, AND THAT THE SOVIET PEOPLE GREETED THESE RESULTS WITH DEEP SATISFACTION. THE AUGUST 7 STATEMENT OF THE POLITBURO, SS PRESIDIUM AND CM REPEATED THESE THEMES, IN PARTICULAR LAUDING THE "OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION OF L.I. BREZHNEV" IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND EXPRESSING "FULL APPROVAL" OF



BREZHNEV'S CSCE SPEECH. PRAVDA'S TWO-COLUMN CSCE EDITORIAL THE NEXT DAY FOLLOWED THE LINE OF THE PREVIOUS TWO ASSESSMENTS.

16. IN CONTRAST, ALTHOUGH THE FIRST ECPC EDITORIAL GAVE A RELATIVELY FULL AND POSITIVE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MEETING AND OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, THE POLITBURO STATEMENT PUBLISHED THE NEXT DAY WAS MARKEDLY LESS ENTHUSIASTIC, PARTICULARLY REGARDING BREZHNEV'S PERSONAL ROLE. THE JULY 5 EDITORIAL WAS FOR THE MOST PART BASED UPON THE POLITBURO'S SUBDUED COMMENT. IN SHORT, UNLIKE THE 1969 AND 1975(

, 857-589, , THE FIRST EDITORIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE ECPC WAS IN EFFECT SIGNIFICANTLY REVISED BY THE POLITBURO, WHICH SET THE TONE FOR THE SUBSEQUENT PRAVDA EDITORIAL OF JULY 5 (WHICH WAS DULY RE-PRINTED IN ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS).

17. ONE FEASIBLE EXPLANATION OF THESE FACTS--AND ONE CAN THINK OF OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS--IS THAT WHILE BREZHNEV AND HIS POLITBURO SUPPORTERS ON THE ECPC ISSUE WERE ABLE TO MODERATE SUSLOV'S TOUGH LINE ON PI, THEY WERE UNABLE FULLY TO CONVINCE SUSLOV, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, OF THE WISDOM OF THIS COURSE. THE IMPLICATION IS THAT SUSLOV REMAINED OPPOSED TO THE "SOFT" BREZHNEV POSITION ON PI, WHICH AT THE 25TH CONGRESS BREZHNEV HIMSELF HAD REFERRED TO AS "ONE OF THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF MARXISM-LENINISM" WHOSE DEFENSE "IS THE SACRED DUTY OF EVERY MARXIST-LENINIST."

18. BREZHNEV SUPPORTERS MAY HAVE COOKED UP A LAUDATORY,  
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MAJOR PRAVDA EDITORIAL FOR PUBLICATION SHORTLY AFTER THE ECPC, CONCEIVABLE HOPING THIS EDITORIAL LINE WOULD SET THE TONE FOR THE FORTHCOMING POLITBURO ASSESSMENT OF THE AFFAIR, AS HAD BEEN THE CASE FOLLOWING THE 1969 MEETING AND THE CSCE SUMMIT. INSTEAD, THE BEST BREZHNEV COULD GET FROM THE POLITBURO WAS A RELATIVELY TERSE, GENERAL ENDORSEMENT CLEARLY LESS LAUDATORY--PARTICULARLY ON BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, THE DOCUMENT, AND THE NEW LINE ON PI--THAN THE TWO-COLUMN PRAVDA EDITORIAL WHICH PRECEDED THE POLITBURO ASSESSMENT BY ONE DAY. THE SECOND ECPC EDITORIAL WAS OBVIOUSLY RESTRAINED BY THE POLITBURO'S ASSESSMENT, ALTHOUGH THE EDITORIAL DID CONTAIN A MILDLY FAVORABLE, ONE-SENTENCE REFERENCE TO BREZHNEV'S SPEECH. ON BALANCE, THE EVIDENCE POINTS TO SOMETHING OF A POLITBURO SETBACK FOR BREZHNEV, WHO SURELY WOULD HAVE PREFERRED THE POLITBURO'S ADOPTING UNANIMOUSLY THE MUCH MORE ENTHUSIASTIC APPRAISAL CONTAINED IN THE JULY 2 EDITORIAL. WHILE BREZHNEV UNDOUBTEDLY BESTED SUSLOV ON THE ECPC OVERALL, THE COST SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN A CONSIDERABLY LESS RESOUNDING POLITBURO APPROVAL THAN BREZHNEV WOULD HAVE DESIRED.

19. THIS INTERPRETATION WOULD ALSO ACCOMMODATE TWO OTHER CURIOUS EDITORIALS ON THE ECPC, ONE IN PRAVDA AND THE OTHER IN THE MILITARY DAILY "KRASNAYA ZVEZDA" (KZ). A PRAVDA EDITORIAL

ENTITLED "THE QUALITY OF PRINCIPLED COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY" APPEARED ON JULY 4, JUST AFTER THE POLITBURO STATEMENT AND JUST BEFORE PRAVDA'S SECOND MAJOR ECPC EDITORIAL. WHERE POLITBURO APPROVAL OF BREZHNEV'S SPEECH WAS CONSPICUOUS BY ITS ABSENCE, THE JULY 4 EDITORIAL STATED THAT "IN WARMLY, WITH ALL THEIR HEARTS APPROVING THE SPEECH OF COMRADE L.I. BREZHNEV AT THE CONFERENCE, AS WELL AS THE DOCUMENT IT ADOPTED, THE WORKERS OF THE LAND OF SOVIETS SHOW HIGH CONSCIOUSNESS, THE QUALITY OF PRINCIPLES IDEOLOGY, INTERNAL MATURITY." THIS CONTAINS THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATION THAT THOSE IN THE POLITBURO, WHO SEEMED TO HAVE REFUSED ONLY A DAY OR SO EARLIER TO ADHERE TO THE LINE OF THE JULY 2 PRAVDA EDITORIAL ON BREZHNEV'S SPEECH, LACKED THESE QUALITIES.

20. IN THIS RESPECT, THERE IS AN INTRIGUING CONGRUENCE BETWEEN KZ JULY 3 AND PRAVDA JULY 4 WHICH IS LACKING BETWEEN THE JULY 2 AND 5 EDITORIALS IN PRAVDA ITSELF, AND COULD INDICATE THAT USTINOV BACKED BREZHNEV ON THIS ISSUE. THE KZ EDITORIAL JULY 3 HAD SOVIET MILITARY MEN "SHARING" THOUGHTS OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE WHO "UNANIMOUSLY  
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APPROVED THE ECPC RESULTS, AND "COMPLETELY AND FULLY SUPPORT THE LENINIST CPSU DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY, THE PROPOSITIONS AND CONCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN THE SPEECH OF COMRADE L.I. BREZHNEV AT THE BERLIN CONFERENCE." KZ DESCRIBES THE SPEECH ITSELF AS:  
--CONTAINING A "DEEP MARXIST-LENINIST ANALYSIS" OF WORLD AFFAIRS;  
--REPRESENTING "THE FURTHEST ELABORATION OF THE PROGRAM FOR STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, FREEDOM AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF PEOPLE, ADOPTED BY THE 25TH CONGRESS;" AND  
--"CONTAINING AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN CONTEMPORARY CIRCUMSTANCES" WHICH REPRESENTS "AN ENORMOUS CONTRIBUTION TO MARXIST-LENINIST THEORY."

21. THUS, THE AVAILABLE FACTS SEEM TO FIT THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE ECPC ISSUES POLARIZED THE LEADERSHIP ALONG SOMETHING OF A PRAGMATIC-IDEOLOGICAL SPECTRUM, WITH THE BREZHNEV MAJORITY ARGUING THAT FURTHERANCE OF THE LONG-TERM FOREIGN POLICY GOALS OF RELAXATION OF TENSION AND INCREASED SOVIET INFLUENCE, PARTICIPATION AND POPULAR SUPPORT IN WESTERN EUROPE FULLY JUSTIFIED THE COST OF BACKING OFF ON PI AS WELL AS THE COST OF AGAIN DISPLAYING DEVIANCE BY A PLETHORA OF PARTIES FROM THE CPSU'S LINE ON IDEOLOGICAL AND PROGRAMMATIC UNITY.

22. AS WE SUGGESTED IN OUR A-118, WE SERIOUSLY DOUBT THAT "IDEOLOGUES" FORM A WELL-DEFINED ANTI-BREZHNEV BLOC, NOR DO WE THINK THEY OPPOSE "DETENTE" PER SE. BUT THEIR APPARENT OBSTINACY OVER THE ECPC SUGGESTS THAT THEY ARE A FORCE BREZHNEV MUST CAREFULLY RECKON WITH WHEN, IN THEIR VIEW, PURSUIT OF "DETENTE" AND THE "PEACE PROGRAM" CONFLICTS WITH OTHER SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY GOALS AND FUNDAMENTAL IDEOLOGICAL TENETS. MATLOCK

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**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** COMMUNISTS, PARTY MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
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**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** CunninFX  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1976MOSCOW11126  
**Document Source:** CORE  
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**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D760271-0215  
**From:** MOSCOW  
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**Office:** ACTION EUR  
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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Previous Classification:** CONFIDENTIAL  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 76 MOSCOW 10532  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** CunninFX  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 MAR 2004  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24 MAR 2004 by greeneet>; APPROVED <04 AUG 2004 by CunninFX>  
**Review Markings:**

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US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
04 MAY 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** BREZHNEV AND THE ECPC: AN EXERCISE IN KREMLINOLOGY  
**TAGS:** PFOR, PINT, UR, XG  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006